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Introduction
For thirty years after its 1942 ruling in Valentine v. Christensen,'
the United States Supreme Court generally held that commercial
speech enjoyed no First Amendment protection.2 Then, beginning in
the mid-1970s with its rulings in Bigelow v. Virginia and Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,4 the
Court developed a commercial speech doctrine that afforded limited
First Amendment protection to commercial speech because the Court
perceived an inextricable link between such speech and regulable
commercial transactions.' After 1980, the Court generally applied the
analysis developed in Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corporation v.
Public Service Communication to afford intermediate First
Amendment protection of commercial speech.6 Then, in the years
following the Court's ruling in Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism
Company,7 and even more noticeably in the latter half of the 1990s,
the Court reshaped its Central Hudson analysis to imbue commercial
speech with increased First Amendment protection.8
This is not the only change in the Court's First Amendment
analysis during these years. In United States v. O'Brien in 1968, the
Court distinguished between content-based laws and content-neutral
laws and developed the test it subsequently applied to what it viewed
as content-neutral, incidental regulations of speech.' The Court
subjects content-based laws to strict scrutiny, but laws the Court
1. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
2. But see N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (extending First
Amendment protection to political content in Civil Rights ad); Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm. on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1973) (suggesting that the First
Amendment might protect legal commercial speech).
3. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
4. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
5. See e.g. Michael Hoefges & Milagros Rivera-Sanchez, Vice Advertising Under
the Supreme Court's Commercial Speech Doctrine: The Shifting Central Hudson Analysis,
22 Hastings Commun. & Ent. L.J. 343, 347 (2000) (noting that the Court for two decades
has "tinkered" with its review of commercial speech).
6. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
7. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
8. See U.S. v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,
514 U.S. 476 (1995); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. R.L, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Greater New Orleans
Broad. Assn. v. U.S., 527 U.S. 173 (1999); Hoefges, supra n. 5, at 349 (concluding that
Court decisions between 1995 and 1999 "elevated First Amendment protection for
commercial speech to its highest level, approaching that of fully protected political and
social speech").
9. 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
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determines are not directed to regulate speech and that do not
discriminate against specific ideas or content are reviewed under the
more lenient O'Brien test.'° Since 1968, the Court has shifted its
O'Brien intermediate scrutiny in two ways. First, the Court has
broadened its use of the test to review laws that once would have
faced - and failed - strict scrutiny." Second, the Court has relaxed the
standards imposed under O'Brien such that the test, at times,
approaches the deferential standard of rational review applied to laws
unrelated to freedom of speech.'2 By the 1990s, in fact, O'Brien
intermediate scrutiny provided little First Amendment protection
against a government regulation that could be said to advance a
content-neutral goal, regardless of the law's actual motivation
towards application on or effects on free speech.
This article begins with an introduction to the concept of
intermediate scrutiny in First Amendment law, and then defines the
O'Brien3 test for content-neutral regulations of speech. The article
outlines the Court's shifting and expanding application of O'Brien
intermediate scrutiny. The article then addresses the Central Hudson
14
test for commercial speech and its changing character. Noting the
original similarities between the O'Brien and Central Hudson tests,
the article will focus on the disparate application of the two tests in
10. See e.g. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) [hereinafter Turner
II]; Michael W. Maseth, The Erosion of First Amendment Protections of Speech and Press:
The 'Must Carry' Provisions of the 1992 Cable Act, 24 Cap. U.L. Rev. 423 (1995); Matthew
D. Segal, The First Amendment and Cable Television: Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 18
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 916, 928 (1995) (noting that Turner II "appears to provide
authority for avoiding strict scrutiny even when a statute on its face refers to content").
11. See Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Content-Neutrality: Inconsistent Applications
of an Increasingly Malleable Doctrine, 29 McGeorge L. Rev. 69 (1997); Ashutosh
Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 297, 299, 305 (1997)
(citing Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) [hereinafter Turner I], Turner I1,
520 U.S. 180, and 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484, to support claim that "constitutional law is
changing," calling the Court's review new, unprincipled, inconsistent and unpredictable,
and asserting that intermediate scrutiny sometimes subjects laws "to minimal or no First
Amendment scrutiny").
12. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of
Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court's Application, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 49, 49 (2000)
(attributing current "confused free speech analysis" to the development of the content-
neutral doctrine); Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as
Judicial Minimalism, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 298, 301 (1998) (endorsing the broad
application of intermediate scrutiny while noting its "indeterminacy" and "vulnerab[ility]
to manipulation by the Supreme Court"); Laurence H. Winer, The Red Lion of Cable and
Beyond?: Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 15 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 1, 28, 47, 64 (1997)
(noting the Court's "subtle shift in language to facilitate its conclusion" that led to both
"misguided characterization[s]" of laws and "major abridgements of free speech").
13. 391 U.S. 367.
14. 447 U.S. 557.
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key decisions in the 1990s.
The analysis of the recent cases highlights a growing divergence
between the Court's review of allegedly content-neutral regulations
of the media and laws regulating commercial speech. Recent Court
decisions suggest that, during the last years of the 20th Century, the
Court simultaneously increased the rigor of its constitutional review
of laws affecting commercial speech and reduced the rigor of its
review of laws affecting the media. This article argues that, taken
together, these two analytical shifts inverted the Court's time-
honored First Amendment hierarchy and undermined the
constitutional protection given to freedom of speech and the press.
Indeed, the unprecedented elevation of First Amendment protection
for commercial speech suggests that the Court may now view
advertising not as an extension of commerce but as a vital source of
information for an enlightened citizenry. The concurrent erosion of
First Amendment protection for media may indicate that the Court is
replacing the constitutional vision of a free press as central to a
functioning democracy with a view of the press as just one more
powerful, profitable business.
I
Intermediate Scrutiny
The United States Supreme Court has adopted a three-tiered
approach to constitutional analysis whereby the Court increases its
scrutiny of laws as their infringement upon fundamental rights
increases."i Laws that directly limit fundamental constitutional rights
are subject to strict scrutiny and must be narrowly tailored to advance
a compelling government interest. In First Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court has applied strict scrutiny to content-based
laws that discriminate on the basis of viewpoint or content.16 Content-
neutral laws, which present a reduced risk of illicit government
motives to suppress specific ideas, face intermediate scrutiny, a type
of constrained balancing test.17 Laws of general application that
impose the most minor intrusions on speech are exposed to the
15. See Bhagwat, supra n. 11.
16. See e.g. U.S. v. Playboy Ent. Group Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812 (2000); City of Erie v.
Pap's AM, 529 U.S. 277, 280 (2000); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
17. See e.g. Glickman v. Wileman Bros., 521 U.S. 457 (1997); Hurley v. Irish-Am.
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995); Board of Trustees v.
Fox, 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995); Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992);
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. St. Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comnn., 461 U.S.
190 (1983).
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minimal scrutiny of rational review. 8 A number of scholars have
noted that strict scrutiny and rational review are "largely outcome
determinative. "19
Although the Supreme Court has applied intermediate scrutiny
to a wide array of First Amendment cases, the Court has failed to
articulate when this standard is applicable.2' In fact, Justice Scalia's
dissent in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, where the Court upheld
no-protest buffer zones around abortion clinics, called intermediate
scrutiny "some kind of default standard., 21 Three years earlier in
Leathers v. Medlock, the Court applied rational review to affirm a
state law taxing cable systems but exempting newspapers.22 The Court
said differential taxation of speakers, even members of the press,
would not trigger heightened scrutiny unless the tax was directed to
suppress particular viewpoints. 23 The Court suggested that the intent
of the legislature was key to determining the applicable level of
scrutiny.24
Yet, in its 1994 decision in Turner I, the Court identified three
conditions that might trigger heightened or intermediate scrutiny of
laws directed to achieve economic goals unrelated to speech but that
incidentally infringed on speech.25 Intermediate scrutiny is triggered,
the Court said, when: 1) laws of general application differentially
affect speakers,26 2) laws, even facially neutral laws, appear to be
motivated by the desire to suppress certain ideas,27 or when 3) a law's
distinctions among media are not justified by "some special
characteristic of the particular medium being regulated., 2' As applied
in the Court's second, 1997 decision upholding cable regulations in
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, intermediate scrutiny
"affords the government latitude in designing a regulatory solution"
18. See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
19. See e.g. Bhagwat, supra n. 11, op. cit. at 305.
20. Lexis/Nexis search Feb. 4, 2000, of United States Supreme Court cases, all
available dates, using the keywords "atleast 3(heightened or intermediate) pre/3 scrutiny"
found 55 cases; "atleast 3(heightened or intermediate) pre/3 review" found 24; "atleast
3(heightened or intermediate) pre/3 standard" found 38; and "atleast 3(heightened or
intermediate) pre/3 test" found 2.
21. 512 U.S. 753, 792 (1994).
22. 499 U.S. at 453.
23. Id. at 447-49, 453.
24. Id. at 449.
25. 512 U.S. at 640,660-61.
26. Id. at 640.
27. Id. at 660.
28. Id. at 660-61.
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and enables it to "employ the means of its choosing so long as the
regulation promotes a substantial governmental interest that would
be achieved less effectively absent the regulation, and does not
burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further that
interest.
29
Furthermore, rather than delineate the rigor of intermediate
scrutiny when it is applied, the Court equivocated in Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC.3" The Court in 2000 upheld limits on
campaign contributions and stated, "The quantum of empirical
evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative
judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of
the justification raised."31
II
Content Neutrality and the O'Brien Test
The concept of content-neutral regulation of speech and the
media emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. Based on analogy to zoning
laws, the doctrine of content neutrality grew from symbolic speech
cases and presumed that the regulation of the time, location, and
circumstance (particularly the volume) of speech raised few concerns
about censorship or distortion of the marketplace of ideas.32 Thus,
content-neutral laws need not be reviewed under the strict scrutiny
applied to laws that directly distort the exchange of ideas.
The United States Supreme Court apparently first mentioned
regulations that are "neutral with respect to content of the speech
involved" in its 1967 decision in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.33 In
Curtis Publishing, the Court upheld a libel verdict and punitive
damages under an actual malice standard, stating that "ideologically
neutral, and generally applicable regulatory measures [may] be
applied to publication[s]."3 The Court stated, "Impositions based on
misconduct can be neutral with respect to content of the speech
involved, free of historical taint, and adjusted to strike a fair balance
between the interests of the community in free circulation of
29. 520 U.S. at 213 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
30. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
31. Id. at 391.
32. See e.g. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 417 U.S. 5 (1976) (proscribing laws that
"slip from the neutrality of time, place, and circumstance into concern with content").
33. 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (This case is the first one discovered through a Lexis/Nexis
search using the keywords "neutral w/5 content and atleast 5(speech).").
34. Id. at 152 (referencing N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. 254).
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information and those of individuals seeking recompense for harm."35
The next year, in United States v. O'Brien, the Court refused to
overturn a conviction for draft-card burning and established the
intermediate scrutiny test for content-neutral laws that incidentally
infringe symbolic speech.36 While recognizing the symbolic meaning
of draft-card burning as protest of the Vietnam War,37 the Court
nonetheless affirmed the federal government's power to prohibit the
destruction of military draft registration documents. The Court in
O'Brien emphasized the facial neutrality of the statute and concluded
that it was a permissible regulation of conduct that imposed only an
incidental burden on speech. The statute was constitutional, the
Court said, because it
[did] not distinguish between public and private destruction,
and it [did] not punish only destruction engaged in for the
purpose of expressing views. A law prohibiting destruction
of Selective Service certificates no more abridges free speech
on its face than a motor vehicle law prohibiting the
destruction of drivers' licenses, or a tax law prohibiting the
destruction of books and records.
In reaching its decision in O'Brien, the Court said the content-
neutral regulation of the non-speech elements of conduct that
combines both speech and action is sufficiently justified:
[1] if [the regulation] is within the constitutional power of
the Government;
[2] if [the regulation] furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest;
[3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and
[4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
35. Id. at 153.
36. 391 U.S. 367.
37. The Court generally has found that regulation of symbolic speech, or speech
acts, is less offensive to the Constitution than is regulation of pure speech. See e.g. Clark v.
Community for Creative Non- Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984) [hereinafter CCNV]; Tex.
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,406 (1989); Bd. of Trustees of St. U. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,
477, 478 (1989) (confirming "that the validity of restrictions on commercial speech should
not be judged by standards more stringent than those applied to expressive conduct
entitled to full First Amendment protection or to relevant time, place, or manner
restrictions"); Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418.
38. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 375 (internal citation omitted).
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freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest 9
The Court rejected the notion that the statute had any
unconstitutional effect."' The Court also refused to determine
whether Congress intended the statute to punish the expression of
disfavored ideas (the defining factor of content-based laws subject to
strict scrutiny).41 The Court said, "[I]t is a familiar principle of
Constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise
constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative
motive." 2
III
O'Brien - Expanding Application, Shifting Standards
A. Expanding Application
The O'Brien Court's intermediate scrutiny test was initially
restricted to marginal areas of "alleged First Amendment freedom,""
such as symbolic speech. The O'Brien test was later applied or
referenced by the Court in more than 100 decisions involving issues
such as compelled commercial speech," regulation of cable, 5
participation in privately sponsored parades, 6 distribution and
solicitation of financial support for religious materials,47 flag burning,4"
cross burning, 9 billboard regulation," sentencing enhancement,51
39. Id. at 377.
40. Id. at 385.
41. Id. at 383.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 377 (This key phrase is cited in only 17 subsequent Supreme Court rulings
referencing O'Brien.); see e.g. Barnes v. Glen Theater, 501 U.S. 560 (1991); Acara v. Cloud
Books, 478 U.S. 687 (1986); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976); Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1972); Healy v.
James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972)).
44. Glickman, 521 U.S. 457; Fox, 115 S. Ct. 1585; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S.
190.
45. Turner II, 520 U.S. 180; Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium v. FCC, 518
U.S. 727 (1996).
46. Hurley, 515 U.S. 557.
47. Society for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 672.
48. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397.
49. RA V v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
50. Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., 499 U.S. 365 (1990).
51. Wisc. v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
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public forums, 2 forced closure of an adult bookstore,53 picketing,54
taxation,55 signage,56 and news rack placement. 7
For example, in Grayned v. The City of Rockford, decided in
1972, the Court upheld a law that prohibited "disruptive" speech and
assemblies outside schools during school hours. 58 The Court in
Grayned struck down an anti-picketing ordinance that impermissibly
distinguished between labor picketing and other peaceful picketing
but held that the anti-noise ordinance was neither unconstitutionally
vague nor unconstitutionally overbroad.59 The Court subjected the
city ordinance to intermediate scrutiny, as a content-neutral
regulation of the time, place and manner of expression.6° "The crucial
question," the Court said, "is whether the manner of expression is
basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at
a particular time.,
61
In 1976, in Buckley v. Valeo, the Court applied O'Brien to strike
down regulations on campaign spending but to uphold contribution
limits. 62 The Court acknowledged the vital role of campaign finance to
the exchange of political ideas but said the regulations were "directed
toward the spending of money, [which] introduces a nonspeech
element., 63 The Court held that the regulations were "neutral as to
the ideas expressed."' Additionally, Justice White, in his concurring
opinion, found that the regulations were also "neutral as to the
content of speech and not motivated by fear of the consequences of
the political speech of particular candidates or of political speech in
general."65 Nevertheless, the Court struck down the spending limits as
overly invasive of speech.66
In a partial dissent, Justice Marshall looked to the effect, rather
52. U.S. v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
53. Cloud Books, 478 U.S. 697.
54. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 445 (1980); but see Madsen, 512 U.S. 753.
55. Leathers, 499 U.S. 439; Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Commr. of
Rev., 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
56. Boos, 485 U.S. 312; but see City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
57. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
58. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
59. Id. at 109.
60. Id. at 115, 121.
61. Id. at 116.
62. 424 U.S. at 58.
63. Id. at 65.
64. Id. at 39.
65. Id. at 259-60 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. Id. at 58. For a recent application of the Court's analysis of campaign
contribution under Buckley, consult Nixon, 528 U.S. 377.
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than the facial neutrality, of the provisions. He wrote:
While the limitations on contributions are neutral in the
sense that all candidates are foreclosed from accepting large
contributions, there can be no question that large
contributions generally mean more to the candidate without
a substantial personal fortune to spend on his campaign.
Large contributions are the less wealthy candidate's only
hope of countering the wealthy candidate's immediate access
to substantial sums of money. With that option removed, the
less wealthy candidate is without the means to match the
large initial expenditures of money of which the wealthy
candidate is capable. In short, the limitations on
contributions put a premium on a candidate's personal
wealth.67
In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of
California, the Court struck down a California regulation requiring
public utilities to provide space in their billing envelopes to
organizations wishing to argue against the utilities' messages.68
Applying the O'Brien test for content-neutral regulations, the Court
held in 1986 that the California regulation unconstitutionally
distorted the marketplace of ideas because it "does not equally
constrain both sides of the debate about utility regulation."'6 9
Based on effect analysis, however, the Court subsequently held
that a regulation that facially "does not favor either side of a political
controversy" might be impermissible if it "prohibit[s] public
discussion of an entire topic."7 Thus, in the 1988 case of Boos v.
Barry, the Court struck down a provision prohibiting critical signs or
displays outside foreign embassies. 7' The Court reasoned that the
legislature had impermissibly justified the provision by references to
"content" and "focus[ed] on the direct impact of speech on its
audience. 72
The Court has also applied the O'Brien test to uphold laws that
single out adult theaters on the basis of the content of their
programming. 73 The Court has said the regulation of adult theaters is
67. Id. at 288 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
69. Id. at 14.
70. Boos, 485 U.S. at 319.
71. Id. at 321.
72. Id. at 320-21.
73. See e.g. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 56 (1986); but see id. at
55 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (calling the content-neutral label "patently flawed" because
[23:723
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a content-neutral restriction on the conduct-like "secondary effects"
of these businesses and is therefore not content based.74
B. Shifting Standards
As the Court applied the O'Brien test to a growing diversity of
fact scenarios, the Court also changed the language of the test. In
1984, the Court reframed prongs three and four of the O'Brien test in
its application in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence. "
The Court in CCNV prohibited a "tent city" demonstration for the
homeless in Lafayette Park and on the Mall in Washington, D. C.76 In
upholding the ban on camping and sleeping in the public areas, the
Court in CCNV re-phrased the O'Brien test.7  The CCNV version of
the O'Brien test required that the law be "justified without reference
to the content of the regulated speech, 78 not that the government's
regulatory interest be "unrelated to the suppression of free
expression."7 9 The Court in CCNV also moved away from O'Brien's
requirement that the restriction on speech be "no greater than is
essential."' The CCNV test required only that the law "leave open
ample alternative channels for communication of the information.""
Four years later, in Boos v. Barry," the Court reinvigorated the
O'Brien test. In Boos, the Court said that only when "justifications
for regulation have nothing to do with content ... [have] we concluded
that the regulation was properly analyzed as content-neutral."83 In
holding that the ban on picketing outside foreign embassies was
unconstitutionally content based, the Court said content neutrality
requires more than mere viewpoint neutrality. '
Rather, [the Court] held that a regulation that 'does not
favor either side of a political controversy' is nonetheless
impermissible because the First Amendment's hostility to
content-based regulation extends ... to prohibition of public
the law has a "potent viewpoint-differential impact").
74. Id.
75. 468 U.S. at 293.
76. Id. at 289.
77. Id. at 293.
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (emphasis added).
80. ld.
81. CCNV, 468 U.S. at 293 (emphasis added).
82. 485 U.S. 312.
83. Id. at 320 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 319.
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discussion of an entire topic."
While Boos affirmed the principle that strict scrutiny should be
applied to any laws that more than incidentally and neutrally affect
protected speech, the Court's 1989 ruling in Ward v. Rock Against
Racism changed course.86 In RAR, the Court upheld a city rule
mandating that city employees control the volume and mixing of
performances in New York City's Central Park band shell as a
reasonable, content-neutral regulation of place and manner. The
Court held that "[t]he principal inquiry in determining content
neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner
cases in particular, is whether the government has adopted a
regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it
conveys."" In O'Brien, however, the Court had required that the
regulation be "unrelated to the suppression of free expression."89
The RAR Court also said content-neutral regulations "need not
be the least restrictive or least intrusive means" of advancing the
government's "legitimate" interest.9° Rather, narrow tailoring under
the RAR standard means only that the "regulation promotes a
substantial government interest that would be achieved less
effectively absent the regulation."9' It is this twisting of O'Brien that
has since controlled the Court's application of intermediate scrutiny
to content-neutral regulations of protected speech.
For example, in 1990, the Court upheld as content neutral a ban
on in-person soliciting outside post offices.92 In United States v.
Kokinda, the Court looked not at any potential disproportionate
effect of the ban but at "the inherent [disruptive] nature of
solicitation itself" and at the intent of the postal service policy.93 The
postal service's "concern about losing customers because of the
potentially unpleasant situation created by solicitation," without
more, simultaneously justified the ban and established its content
85. Id. (rejecting argument that demonstration that a law is not viewpoint-based is
sufficient to establish that it also is content-neutral) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1989)).
86. 491 U.S. 781 (1989) [hereinafter RAR].
87. Id. at 803.
88. Id. at 791 (emphasis added).
89. 391 U.S. at 377 (emphasis added).
90. 491 U.S. at 798.
91. Id. at 799.
92. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 737.
93. Id. at 736.
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neutrality.94 "Nothing suggests the Postal Service intended to
discourage one viewpoint and advance another," the Court said."
"[Rather,] by excluding all... groups ... the Postal Service is not
granting to one side of a debatable public question.., a monopoly in
expressing its views."" The absence of a monopoly grant, it seems,
was tantamount to content neutrality. The Court was unswayed by
the likelihood that certain groups or ideas would be more likely to
attempt to express their views through such direct solicitation.
In subsequent cases, the Court focused on legislative intent to
determine the content neutrality of laws.7 In 1992, in Simon &
Schuster v. New York State Crime Victims Board, the Court used illicit
legislative intent to strike down a state law imposing financial burdens
on the speech of certain criminals.98 A year later, in Cincinnatti v.
Discovery Network, the Court found that a facially neutral city ban on
commercial newsracks served to disguise an unconstitutional content-
based intent."
Then, the plurality of the Court, in its 1994 Turner I opinion,
defined content-neutral regulations largely by what the legislature
does not intend to do. '1 ° Acknowledging that it "is not always a simple
task" to determine the content neutrality of a law, the Court said
federal rules requiring cable operators to carry local broadcast
programming were content neutral.' °' The Court said a law is content
neutral so long as government does not intend to punish
communication based on government "agreement or disagreement
with the message it conveys," or to "distinguish favored speech from
disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed."1"
In Turner I, the Court also relaxed the narrow tailoring
requirement of the O'Brien test to require only that a "substantial
portion of the burden on speech... advance the [s]tate's content-
neutral goals."'' 3 Applying that standard three years later, the Court
in Turner H rejected any need to examine regulatory alternatives to
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. Id.
96. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
97. See e.g. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410; Simon & Schuster v. N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1992).
98. 502 U.S. at 117.
99. 507 U.S. at 429.
100. 512 U.S. at 643.
101. Id. at 642, 652.
102. Id. at 642-43.
103. Id. at 682.
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demonstrate "fit.""'' The Court stated, "Our cases establish that
content-neutral regulations are not invalid simply because there is
some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on
speech" or "because some alternative solution is marginally less
intrusive on a speaker's First Amendment interests."'0' Turner II
transformed the O'Brien requirement that the law's infringement on
free speech be "no greater than is essential"'0 6 to require only that the
governmental interest "would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation."'0 7 To determine this, however, the Court need neither
closely examine "the logic of the regulatory scheme" nor decide
whether the government might achieve its goals through less speech-
intrusive means.108
In contrast to the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor dissented
sharply in Turner I, stating that the must-carry rules were based on an
impermissible content distinction in which "the government...
decide[s] who may speak and who may not."'"' In looking to the effect
of the law, Justice O'Connor stated, "Laws that single out particular
speakers are substantially more dangerous [than laws of general
application], even when they do not draw explicit content
distinctions.""0  Moreover, Justice O'Connor said, "benign
motivation" cannot reduce the scrutiny of laws that "make reference
to content [even though] [t]hey may not reflect hostility to particular
points of view, or a desire to suppress certain subjects.""'
When the case returned to the Court three years later, in Turner
II, Justice O'Connor noted that fear of anticompetitive behavior does
not provide a content-neutral basis for sustaining a law that
discriminates among speakers."2 The plurality of the Court, however,
reaffirmed its reasoning that, regardless of their disparate impact,
laws intended to reduce market power and improve citizen access to
diverse information sources are content neutral, and need survive
only the O'Brien test of intermediate scrutiny."3
104. 520 U.S. at 217.
105. Id. at 217, 218.
106. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
107. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 213 (quoting RAR, 491 U.S. at 799).
108. Id. at 249 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
109. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 677.
112. Turner 11, 520 U.S. at 235 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 186.
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IV
O'Brien - The Decline of Media Freedom
In Turner I and Turner II, the United States Supreme Court
applied a distorted O'Brien/RAR intermediate scrutiny test to uphold
federal laws requiring cable operators to carry broadcast television
stations.' In both decisions, the Court refused to delineate the First
Amendment status of cable broadcasting, but reiterated that mere
distinctions among media rarely dictate strict scrutiny.1" The Court in
Turner I emphasized that since content-neutral laws do not present
the same "inherent dangers to free expression" as do content-based
regulations, they are subject to less rigorous analysis by the Court."6
Turning the content-neutral test on its head, the Court further held in
Turner I that a content-neutral purpose may be presumed when
extensive legislative fact-finding exists and fails to demonstrate
governmental favor or disfavor with the content being affected."'
Despite upholding the must-carry provisions as constitutional,
the Court could not muster a majority to agree upon the
government's content-neutral purpose for the regulations."' The
plurality of the Court held that it must defer to Congress's judgment
"so long as its policy is grounded on reasonable factual findings
supported by evidence that is substantial for a legislative
determination.". 9 The Turner H plurality deferred to Congress to
determine both the reality of the problem to be addressed by the
must-carry laws and the magnitude of the problem that "justified
enactment of the must-carry provisions. 1 21 Congress's conclusion that
the law was necessary to prevent cable systems from dropping some
broadcasters and endangering some over-the-air programming was
proof, according to the plurality opinion, that the must-carry laws
were reasonable. On this basis, the Turner H plurality opinion said
114. 512 U.S. at 637, 668; 520 U.S. at 213-14.
115. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 637; Turner H, 520 U.S. at 189-90; see also FCC v. Midwest
Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979); Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,
557 (1975); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); Assoc. Press v. U.S., 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)
(establishing that distinct regulation tailored to the unique characteristics of any medium
is not facially suspect).
116. 512 U.S. at 661.
117. Id. at 642.
118. Turner 11, 520 U.S. at 185,195-98.
119. Id. at 224. This "reasonable" standard echoes the language of rational review
traditionally applied by the Court to laws that do not infringe constitutional protections.
120. Id. at 196.
121. Id. at 201-02.
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the law was a significantly important, content-neutral, "'industry-
specific antitrust and fair trade"' provision "'designed to prevent
cable operators from exploiting their economic power to the
detriment of broadcasters.' 122 Then, in lieu of analysis, the principal
opinion of the Court simply asserted that "it [is] apparent [that] must-
carry serves the government's interests 'in a direct and effective
way.
12 3
In his crucial concurrence, Justice Breyer expressly rejected the
plurality's content-neutral basis for the must-carry law and said the
law clearly infringed the First Amendment freedoms of both cable
operators and non-broadcast programmers. Instead, Justice Breyer
asserted that the government's "sufficient basis" for the must-carry
laws was its interest in advancing "a rich mix of over-the-air
programming" and its desire "to prevent too precipitous a decline in
the quality and quantity of programming choice. 1 25 Justice Breyer
said promotion of a multiplicity of voices was a "governmental
purpose of the highest order," but he upheld the must-carry laws
without analyzing whether this stated purpose was either content-
neutral or only incidentally related to speech, as required by
O'Brien. 1
6
V
Central Hudson - Commercial Speech Standards
As these Supreme Court rulings lowered the bar against
regulations that infringe the First Amendment rights of media,27
several roughly contemporaneous opinions raised the constitutional
bar against regulation of speech related to commercial activities.
Originally, the Court shunned truthful commercial speech as
irrelevant to the exchange of ideas protected by the First
Amendment." The Court also avowed the constitutionality of laws
that punished false or fraudulent commercial messages to protect the
strong consumer interest in informed consumer choice. 129 Then in
122. Id. at 186 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32,40 (D.D.C.
1993)); see also Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 649.
123. Turner 11, 520 U.S. at 213 (quoting RAR, 491 U.S. at 800).
124. Id. at 225 (Breyer, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 225-26.
126. Id. at 227 (internal citation omitted).
127. Id. at 180; Turner 1, 512 U.S. 622.
128. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 920 (1942); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622
(1951).
129. See Kozinski & Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial
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1975, in Bigelow v. Virginia, the Court asserted that truthful
commercial speech enjoyed some First Amendment protection
because it contributed value to the marketplace of ideas.' The
following year, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, the Supreme Court struck down a
Virginia state ban on drug price ads. 3' In reaching their decision, the
Court relied heavily on the analysis provided in previous decisions
regarding First Amendment protection of political speech.132 Virginia
Board headed a line of cases in which the Court said the First
Amendment prohibited advertising bans unrelated to consumer
protection.
133
These rulings, however, suggested that government could
regulate commercial advertising "in a variety of ways and for a variety
of reasons" far more easily than it could censor other forms of
protected speech.' The Court stated that "common sense
differences" between commercial and noncommercial speech, the
greater ease of assessing the falsity of "objective" commercial speech
claims, and the increased "hardiness" that the profit motive instilled
in commercial speech all justified lesser scrutiny of intrusive
government regulation of commercial speech than of other protected
speech. 35 The Court said the power to regulate commercial speech
also arose from the inextricable link between that speech and
regulable commercial transactions.36
By 1980, however, a majority of the Central Hudson Court
required the government to show that its interest in constraining
commercial speech could not be advanced through regulations less
harmful to speech interests."7 Rejecting strict scrutiny of a New York
ban on advertising by electrical utilities, the Court established a four-
part test in Central Hudson to determine when regulation of
Speech, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 747 (1993).
130. 421 U.S. 809.
131. 425 U.S. at 773.
132. Id. at 761-62 (citing cases such as N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. 254, Smith v. Cal., 361
U.S. 147 (1959), Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476 (1957), and Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568
(1942)).
133. See e.g. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557; Bates v. St. Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350
(1977); Carey v. Population Serv. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Linmark Assoc. v. Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85 (1977).
134. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 522 (Thomas, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 498 (citing Bates, 433 U.S. 350).
136. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio St. Bar Assn., 436 U.S.
447 (1978); see e.g. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345-46 (expressly upholding a ban on casino
gambling advertising).
137. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
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commercial speech violated the First Amendment. 138 To fall under
the First Amendment, commercial speech "must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading."1 39 Once this hurdle is cleared, the
burden shifts to government to demonstrate that:
1) its regulatory "interest is substantial,"
2) the regulation "directly advances the governmental
interest," and
3) the regulation is "not more extensive than necessary.' 40
In Central Hudson, the Court said this intermediate level of
scrutiny was justified because the lesser value of commercial speech
did not warrant strict scrutiny protection. 4' The Central Hudson test
has dominated commercial speech jurisprudence for the past twenty
142
years.
The Court and numerous scholars have suggested that this test is
virtually indistinguishable from the O'Brien test.1 43 For that reason
among others, the Court has been castigated for its distinction
between commercial and non-commercial speech 44 and for its
inconsistent rulings in the area of commercial speech.' 45 In particular,
the Court's application of the Central Hudson test to cases involving
"vice" advertising has generated special concern among scholars.' 46
The key to the debate is the Court's 1986 decision in Posadas de
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 573.
142. Note that the Court might have easily applied O'Brien on the grounds that
commercial speech regulations are designed to restrict the commercial, nonspeech
component of the message.
143. See e.g. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 376-77; S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S.
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 537 n. 16 (1987) (calling the two tests "substantially
similar"); Fox, 492 U.S. at 478 (calling the tests "similar"); Dana Grantham Lennox, Note:
Hello, Is Anybody Home? Deregulation, Discombobulation, and the Decision in U.S. West
v. FCC, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 1645, 1700 (2000); R. Randall Kelso, Three Years Hence: An
Update on Filling Gaps in the Supreme Court's Approach to Constitutional Review of
Legislation, 36 S.U. L. Rev. 1, 34 (1995) (referring to "tortured" distinction among tests of
mid-level review); Robert N. Kravitz, Trademarks, Speech, and the Gay Olympics Case, 69
B.U. L. Rev. 131, 174 (1989); Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of
Commercial Speech, 58 Mo. L. Rev. 55, 141 (1999).
144. See e.g. Daniel E. Troy, Advertising: Not "Low Value" Speech, 16 Yale L.J. on
Reg. 85, 88-90 (1999).
145. See e.g. Phillip B. Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico: "'Twas Strange, 'Twas
Passing Strange, 'Twas Pitiful, 'Twas Wondrous Pitiful," 1986 S. Ct. Rev. 1 (1986).
146. See e.g. Hoefges & Rivera-Sanchez, supra n. 5, at 347.
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Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico.47 In what
has been called "the Court's most lenient application of intermediate
scrutiny,"'' 18 a 5-4 majority of the Court deferred to the interests of the
Puerto Rican legislature to uphold a ban on ads for legalized casino
gambling that targeted the Puerto Rican public. 4 9 In addition to the
established rationale that commercial speech warrants only reduced
constitutional protection, the Court in Posadas reasoned that 1) bans
on advertising of "vice" activities are subject to even lesser scrutiny
and 2) the governmental ability to ban a commercial activity carries
with it the collateral ability to ban speech about that activity."
A 1993 ruling upholding part of a ban on broadcast state lottery
advertisements extended this logic. In United States v. Edge
Broadcasting Co., the Court said "it would be incompatible with the
subordinate position of commercial speech in the scale of First
Amendment values to apply a more rigid standard to commercial
speech than is applied to fully protected speech.'.. The Court voted
7-2 that a ban on lottery ads in non-lottery states was a "reasonable"
means to "directly" protect the policies of both lottery and non-
lottery states."2
VI
The "Most Recent" Commercial Speech Cases
In marked contrast with Posadas and Edge, the Court in 1996
unanimously struck down a state ban on price advertising for alcohol
in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island.'53 In so doing, the Court
directly attacked previous rationales that justified reduced
constitutional protection of commercial speech."' The Court
increased the vigor of the Central Hudson standard to overturn the
ban at issue in 44 Liquormart and said Central Hudson's intermediate
scrutiny was insufficiently "rigorous" when the state's interest in
regulating commercial messages "is [in]consistent with the reasons for
according constitutional protection to commercial speech."'55
147. 478 U.S. at 337-44.
148. Hoefges & Rivera-Sanchez, supra n. 5, at 361.
149. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 355.
150. Id. at 361.
151. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 430.
152. Id. at 426, 428-29.
153. 517 U.S. at 501.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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Regulations that suppress the truth are no less troubling
because they target objectively verifiable information, nor
are they less effective because they aim at durable messages.
As a result, neither the 'greater objectivity' nor the 'greater
hardiness' of truthful, nonmisleading commercial speechjustifies reviewing its complete suppression with added
deference.'56
Indeed, the Court said, "[T]he First Amendment directs us to be
especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the
dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.'
57
The Court flatly rejected as erroneous its Posadas analysis. 56 The
44 Liquormart opinion said the Posadas decision to uphold a ban on
gambling advertisements was too deferential to legislative
discretion.'59 The Court said Posadas had reasoned incorrectly that
the legislature was free to choose whether to suppress truthful,
nonmisleading commercial messages rather than regulate the targeted
commercial behavior.' "The text of the First Amendment makes
clear that the Constitution presumes that attempts to regulate speech
are more dangerous than attempts to regulate conduct," the 44
Liquormart Court said.'
Instead of blind deference, the standard established by the Court
in 44 Liquormart requires an evaluation of a ban's effectiveness and
an examination of alternatives to determine a ban's
constitutionality. 2 To do this, the Court must leave "some room for
the exercise of legislative judgment"'63 while assuring that the
regulation is "no more extensive than necessary."'" A properly
crafted regulation is not "ineffective or remote" from its objective
and "directly advances"'65 its purpose "to a material degree" or
"significantly. '""6
Additionally, Justice O'Connor argued in a lengthy concurrence
that rather than "accept at face value the proffered justification" for
156. Id. at 502 (internal citations omitted).
157. Id. at 503 (plurality) (internal citations omitted).
158. Id. at 509.
159. Id. at 510.
160. Id. at 509.
161. Id. at 512 (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 507.
163. Id. at 508.
164. Id. at 507.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 505.
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regulation of lawful commercial speech, the Court must engage in a
"searching" examination of the regulation's fit with the government's
asserted goals.'67 The necessary "fit between the legislature's goal and
method" need not be "perfect" or the "single best disposition" or
"the least restrictive means," according to O'Connor.' 6' Rather, the fit
must be "reasonable," "in proportion to the interest served,"
"narrowly tailored," and "reasonably ... targeted to address the harm
intended to be regulated." '169 Regulations of commercial speech are
more likely to be reasonable if the government has conducted a
"careful calculat[ion of] the costs and benefits associated with the
burden on speech imposed by its prohibition;" if there are no "less
burdensome alternatives to reach the stated goal;" and "if alternative
channels permit communication of the restricted speech.'
70
This stringent application of the Central Hudson test
foreshadowed the Court's 1999 unanimous decision to strike down
part of a federal ban on broadcast ads for casino gambling. In Greater
New Orleans Broadcasting Association v. United States,17' the United
States Supreme Court used "Central Hudson, as applied in [its] most
recent commercial speech cases," to unanimously reject the right of
the Federal Communications Commission to prohibit broadcast ads
for privately operated casinos.' The Court rigorously applied the
Central Hudson test and ruled unconstitutional the federal ban on ads
for private casinos in states where such gambling was legal. 173 The
Court said the broadcast audience, not the government, should
determine the value of these truthful advertisements. 17'
Justice Thomas concurred with the majority's holding. However,
Justice Thomas argued that all government regulations intended "to
keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to
manipulate their choices in the marketplace" are "per se
illegitimate.' 75 Chief Justice Rehnquist, who once castigated the
Court for elevating commercial expression between a buyer and a
seller to "the same plane as... the free marketplace of ideas,'
176
167. Id. at 531 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 529 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
169. Id.
170. Id. (internal citations omitted).
171. 527 U.S. 173.
172. Id. at 184 (emphasis added) (provisions explicitly exempt state-operated
lotteries, government gambling operations, and tribal casinos from the ban).
173. Id. at 195.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 197 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
176. Va. St. Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 781.
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concurred with the opinion.7 I
In Greater New Orleans, the Court expressly rejected
fundamental premises of its Posadas reasoning and deference.' 78 The
Court directly rejected any notion of reduced protection for "vice"
advertising. 179 The Court also rejected dicta that the "greater" power
to regulate commercial conduct necessarily includes the "lesser"
power to regulate speech about that conduct.8 °
The Court failed to further consider whether broadcast speech
warranted reduced First Amendment protection.8 ' Instead, the Court
in Greater New Orleans carefully examined the intent, the application,
and the broad "regulatory scheme" '82 of the federal government and
decided that the government's interest was far from clear; the harm to
be addressed was uncertain; the ban's efficacy was undemonstrated;
and the regulatory strategy was "so pierced by exemptions and
inconsistencies that the government [could not] hope to exonerate
it."'83 Moreover, the Court said the law was not appropriately tailored
because "practical and nonspeech-related forms of regulation [were
readily identifiable] ... that could more directly and effectively
alleviate some of the social costs of casino gambling.', 84 Although the
Court said regulation of truthful commercial speech "may
incidentally, even deliberately, restrict a certain amount of speech not
thought to contribute significantly to the dangers with which the
government is concerned," such regulation must, at a minimum,
provide "a rough approximation of efficacy [or] a reasonable
accommodation of competing State and private interests."'85
The Court also held that the "[g]overnment [had] present[ed] no
convincing reason for pegging its speech ban to the identity of the
owners or operators of the advertised casinos."'88 When a law
distinguishes among information based on the identity of the
speakers, the Court said government must provide "sound reason[s]
why such lines bear any meaningful relationship to the particular
177. Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 196-97 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Three
years earlier, he also concurred with the Court's opinion in 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484.
178. Id. at 182.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 183-94 (referencing Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345-346).
181. Id. at 184 (equating broadcast messages generally with protected commercial
speech).
182. Id. at 182-92.
183. Id. at 190.
184. Id. at 192 (emphasis added).
185. Id. at 194.
186. Id. at 191.
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interest asserted.... [D]ecisions that select among speakers conveying
virtually identical messages are in serious tension with the principles
undergirding the First Amendment." '187
VII
Intermediate Scrutiny in the '90s
In 44 Liquormart and Greater New Orleans, the Court
established a rigorous standard of mid-level review of laws to strike
down bans on certain types of commercial speech. At the same time,
the Turner I and H decisions employed a relaxed standard of
intermediate review to uphold a federal law requiring cable operators
to carry broadcast stations." In the two commercial speech cases, the
Court demanded that the government justify its intrusion into the
freedom of speech of those seeking to advertise alcohol and
gambling.89 In the two Turner decisions, the Court accepted the
economic value of the regulation and brushed aside concern for the
free speech rights of cable operators and non-broadcast content
providers."
The heart of the distinction between the commercial speech and
the cable rulings lies in the Court's definition and application of
intermediate level scrutiny. The Greater New Orleans ruling is the
logical extension of seven Supreme Court decisions since Posadas
that apply increasingly rigorous intermediate scrutiny to non-
consumer protection-oriented regulations of commercial speech.'9t
The Turner decisions culminate a separate and disparate trend: the
Court's increasingly deferential and relaxed application of
intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral laws that restrict non-
commercial speech.'92
187. Id. at 194 (emphasis added).
188. 520 U.S. 180; 512 U.S. 622.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 181-84 (noting that "[p]artly because of
[Central Hudson's] intricacies, petitioners as well as certain judges, scholars, and amici
curiae have advocated repudiation of the Central Hudson standard and implementation of
a more straightforward and stringent test for assessing the validity of governmental
restrictions on commercial speech."); see Glickman, 521 U.S. 457; 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S.
484; Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476; Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993); Discovery
Network, 507 U.S. 410; Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418; Fox, 492 U.S. 469.
192. Turner 1, 512 U.S. 622; Turner II, 520 U.S. 180.
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VIII
The Seeds of Doctrinal [R]Evolution
The recent Supreme Court decisions elevating the protection of
commercial speech build upon abundant language from earlier
commercial speech rulings. For more than two decades, members of
the United States Supreme Court have argued that any systematic
reduction of First Amendment protection should be limited to that
narrow subset of commercial speech that is more likely to deceive or
to manipulate consumer choices.9
In the past five years, the minority language of Justice Blackmun
has come to dominate and direct commercial speech jurisprudence. In
fact, Chief Justice Rehnquist, once the most outspoken proponent of
rigid limits on the protection of commercial speech, joined both the
44 Liquormart94 and Greater New Orleans1 9 opinions. In Central
Hudson, then-Justice Rehnquist argued vehemently in his dissent that
the Court's "fail[ure] to give due deference to th[e] subordinate
position of commercial speech.., effectively accomplished the
devitalization of the First Amendment."'96 Yet, not a single justice in
the two most recent decisions supported that broad subordinate
position doctrine for commercial speech. To the contrary, Justice
Thomas argued that the First Amendment dictates that many,
perhaps most, commercial speech bans are per se unconstitutional.97
The Court's revisioning of content-neutral regulation of non-
commercial speech rests on thinner precedent. Rather than building
from concurrences and dicta within majority opinions, the expanded
and relaxed application of O'Brien intermediate scrutiny stands First
Amendment law on its head. Nearly half a century ago, Justice
Frankfurter made clear that the First Amendment dictates that "a
legislature [may] not prescribe what ideas may be noisily
193. See e.g. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 494; see also Va. St. Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S.
at 761; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 477 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("Additional restrictions [or
commercial speech] can be justified only to the degree that dangers which the State has a
right to prevent are actually presented by conduct attendant to such speech."); Discovery
Network, 507 U.S. at 431, 436 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[I]ntermediate scrutiny is [not]
appropriate ... for a regulation that suppresses truthful commercial speech;" "truthful,
noncoercive commercial speech concerning lawful activities is entitled to full First
Amendment protection."); Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. at 494.
194. 517 U.S. at 528 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
195. 527 U.S. at 196 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
196. 447 U.S. at 589, 591.
197. See e.g. Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 197 (Thomas, J., concurring);
Glickman, 521 U.S. at 504 (Thomas, J., dissenting); 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 518
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and in judgment).
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expressed ... nor discriminate among those who would make inroads
upon the public peace." 98 Yet, the Court since has moved away from
the clear determination of whether a law discriminates among ideas
or speakers as the basis for its decisions. Instead, the Court has
attempted to assess the permissibility of the legislature's motive for
"singl[ing] out certain ideas for repression.""' By 1984, a majority of
the Court would refuse to provide the most stringent First
Amendment review of a ban on public assembly because the ban was
"not being applied because of disagreement with the message
presented.""
In recent years, it has fallen to dissenting justices to argue "that
government agencies by their very nature are driven to
overregulate... to the detriment of First Amendment rights, [and]
that facial viewpoint neutrality is no shield against unnecessary
restrictions on unpopular ideas or modes of expression. 201 Indeed, in
at least one speech ruling in the 1990s, the principal opinion of the
Court argued that "discriminatory... treatment is suspect under the
First Amendment only when the legislature intends to suppress
certain ideas.""2 2 In Turner I and /, content neutrality came to mean
anything that did not "distinguish favored speech from disfavored
speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed."'2 3 The Court in
Turner has wandered a long way from the historical position that
viewpoint neutrality is irrelevant to content neutrality and that
content neutrality requires that a law be unrelated to content.
Ix
Significance
These two sets of cases suggest a marked transformation of
established First Amendment protections." Indeed, taken together,
198. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949); but see Denver Area Educ. Telecom.
Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 803 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in
part, dissenting in part) ("It contravenes the First Amendment to give government a
general license to single out some categories of speech for lesser protection so long as it
stops short of viewpoint discrimination.").
199. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 771 (Stevens, J., concurring).
200. CCNV, 468 U.S. at 294-95.
201. Id. at 315-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
202. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 429 (emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted).
203. Turner H, 520 U.S. at 186 (internal citations omitted).
204. See e.g. R. Michael Hoefges, The Current Constitutional Landscape for
Commercial Speech: Implications for Color and Imagery in Tobacco Advertising,
unpublished paper presented to 1997 AEJMC Convention, Chicago; Sigman L. Splichal,
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they challenge standards that long have provided points of light in the
penumbral body of First Amendment jurisprudence. They suggest a
re-definition and revised application of intermediate scrutiny that
challenges the axiom that commercial speech enjoys less First
Amendment protection than does noncommercial speech. 5
The recent Unite States Supreme Court rulings on commercial
speech suggest a new respect for the value of commercial speech in
the marketplace of ideas. Today "[t]he mere fact that messages
propose commercial transactions does not in and of itself dictate the
constitutional analysis."2" Rather, the Court has determined that
most advertising regulation should be subjected to something close to
strict scrutiny. In evaluating laws that regulate truthful commercial
messages, the Court does not defer to legislative findings but engages
in a searching examination of the law's "fit" and effectiveness.
Evidence of less speech-intrusive alternatives demonstrates a poor
legislative fit and generally renders a law unconstitutional.
The same is not true of the Court's rulings on laws that affect
media autonomy or speech. In the eleven years since RAR, the
Court has distorted the definition of content neutrality to permit
government regulation relating to content and distinguishing among
speakers when the legislative motive is "pure." The Court has erased
its established "bright-line rule [that] any restriction on speech, the
application of which turns on the content of the speech, is a content-
based restriction. '' 21 Instead, the Court now defines as content-based
only those laws motivated by expressed governmental agreement or
disagreement with the message conveyed.
2 9
The Court has also rejected the least-intrusive-means test and
Matthew D. Bunker & J. Brian O'Loughlin, First Amendment Scrutiny and Commercial
Speech: Raising the Bar for Regulating Advertising of Lawful Products, unpublished paper
presented to 1997 AEJMC Convention, Chicago; Mark Tushnet, New Meaning for First
Amendment: Free speech may be seen as a tool for protecting those in power, 81 ABA J. 56
(Nov. 1995).
205. See e.g. Central Hudson, 446 U.S. at 562-63 (defining commercial speech as of
"less constitutional moment"); but see e.g. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 526-27 (calling the
Central Hudson test an effort "to weigh incommensurables" and noting that "[t]he courts,
including this Court, have found the Central Hudson 'test' to be, as a general matter, very
difficult to apply with any uniformity. This may result in part from the inherently
nondeterminative nature of a case-by-case balancing 'test' unaccompanied by any
categorical rules, and the consequent likelihood that individual judicial preferences will
govern application of the test."); see also id. at 527 n. 8 and n. 9.
206. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501.
207. 491 U.S. 781.
208. Boos, 485 U.S. at 335-36 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
209. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 642 (citing RAR, 491 U.S. at 791).
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refrained from determining the differential impact of regulatory
options, to decide whether a speech-related, content-neutral law is
properly tailored to the governmental goal. In place of an exacting
calculus of costs and benefits, the Court has deferred to legislative
record. Rather than require the government to demonstrate with
convincing evidence the necessity and fitness of the law, the Court
asks the offended party to prove that the law is motivated by illicit
intent.
This trend departs radically from a century of Court precedents
that interpret the First Amendment to dictate that "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press"2 ' in
order to require that the vast majority of speech-intrusive laws
undergo the most stringent scrutiny. In fact, the principal opinion in
Turner H suggests this trend may go even further: today the Court
may apply more exacting analysis to purely economic or structural
provisions than it does to speech-related laws labeled content-
neutral."' In Turner H the Court held that while antitrust law
"requires courts to delve deeply into the theory of economic
organization, '  review of content-neutral infringements on First
Amendment speakers requires the Court "simply to determine if ...
the legislative conclusion was reasonable and supported by
substantial evidence in the record before Congress." '213 It is unclear
how this latter standard differs significantly, if at all, from rational
review.
210. U.S. Const., amend. I.
211. Turner H, 520 U.S. at 208. ("This is not a case in which we are called upon to
give our best judgment... as we would in a case arising, say, under the antitrust laws....
We need not put our imprimatur on Congress' economic theory in order to validate the
reasonableness of its judgment.").
212. Id. at 207 (internal cite omitted).
213. Id. at 195, 211.
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Conclusion
Taken together, the shifts in commercial speech jurisprudence
and the misapplication of intermediate scrutiny standards214 reverse
traditional free speech values. These decisions blur the few bright-line
rules that delineated commerce from free expression, collapsing
speech categories and contorting tests to ravage established First
Amendment doctrines. In the place of clear jurisprudence, the United
States Supreme Court rulings of the late 1990s offer little beyond
biting rhetoric and a Court deeply divided in its views.
214. Id. at 229, 258 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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